Lay Perceptions of Science

Here, I use quantitative methods, predominantly survey experiments, to examine how people evaluate scientific information.

  1. Laypeople Use Institutional Information Cues in Judging the Plausibility of Research Findings
    2025, Socius
    with I.F. Deviatko, V. Polyakova, K. Fursov
    Print · OSF · Abstract

Mediatization of science communication facilitates broader access to scientific knowledge. However, in the post-truth era, it makes the task of critical evaluation of science-based information more challenging than ever for laypeople. The authors conducted a factorial survey as part of a nationally representative Russian survey panel to evaluate the influence of institutional information cues on laypersons’ plausibility judgments. The findings indicate that funding information and institutional affiliation influence how the general public perceives the plausibility of scientific results. The data obtained also show that research results from various scientific disciplines are perceived differently in terms of their plausibility.

  1. Plausibility of Scientific Findings: Institutional Factors in Lay Evaluations
    2022, Journal of Science Communication
    with I.F. Deviatko
    Print · OSF · Abstract

One of the recent “crises” experienced by science is associated with a decline in its public support. We conducted two factorial surveys among university students aiming at broadening our understanding of the information cues influencing the wider publics’ judgments of science. We found that sociological and criminological research results are perceived as less plausible compared to neuroscientific and physiological research, but as more plausible than results from genetics. In contrast with the previous data on the importance of funding and institutional prestige cues as the indirect indicators of the research quality among academic experts, we discovered the absence of any effects of funding or institutional prestige for the selected type of general audience.

  1. Factors of Public Trust in Science: A Scoping Review of Empirical Studies
    2022, Monitoring of Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes (In Russ.)
    Print

Moral Order and Regulation in Science

Here, I mainly think about the way morality operates in science and how to study it.

  1. Fragile Public Trust as a Moral Cue for Judging Questionable Research Practices in Science
    2025, Working Paper
    Print · OSF

  2. “Public Trust” as Moral Vocabulary of Science
    2025, Working Paper
    Print · OSF

  3. The Morality of Scientists and Scientific Ethos: A Revision of Concepts and a New Approach
    2021, Sociology of Science and Technology (In Russ.)
    Print

Discourses, Public Ideas, and Stylized Facts

Here, I speculate about the life and effects of discursive objects.

  1. Is it Useful and/or Accurate to Think of Algorithmic Curation as Epistemic Coercion?
    2024, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science
    with G. Eyal
    Print · Abstract

We argue that the concept of epistemic coercion is neither accurate nor useful for describing and thinking about the significance of the new practices of algorithmic curation, and that Foucault’s concept of rarefaction is better suited for this purpose. After establishing what Turner means by epistemic coercion, we show that it differs from how the concept of coercion is typically defined and used by philosophers and sociologists, especially because Turner does not identify a threat that causes the coerced people to act under duress. We then detail our reasons for why the concept of coercion, to our minds, flattens and to some extent distorts our understanding of the practice of curation. Among these reasons are the blurry lines and interdependence between curation and self-curation, thus between “coercion” and “resistance”; the absence of a plausible “threat” that could justify conceptualizing the operation as coercion; the inescapability of curation in order to navigate the “information glut”; as well the question of whether users of social media are aware that their information environment is curated. Finally, and directly following from these reasons, we show that Foucault’s concept of discursive “rarefaction” offers a lot more insight into the novelty and nature of contemporary curation practices. Indeed, we argue that viewed from this perspective, social media appears to represent a new rearrangement and ordering of discourse, the formation of an interface between “ordinary utterances” and “disciplines,” between everyday talk and expert discourse. This intermediate realm, where discursive events are neither ephemeral nor preserved “in the true,” depends on rarefaction-qua-curation for its existence and functioning.